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Afghan vs. Soviet Tactics  how to cut LOCs and win as in Afghan-Soviet War
Afghan vs. Soviet Tactics
How to Cut LOCs and Win
© 2010
127 pages; 18 chapters
During the Red Army’s occupation of Afghanistan, there were great
differences in
Afghan vs. Soviet Tactics. After the initial fighting, the victorious
communists ceded the initiative to the barbaric Mujahideen (Muj). From then on
out, in the
Soviet-Afghan war of Afghan vs. Soviet Tactics, the Soviets
were on the defensive. Obviously the
Soviets had lost a professionalism
displayed earlier in history, but there was also something wrong with the
Army’s conventional generals
. The difference was in Afghan vs. Soviet
that resulted from the Soviet conventional generals failing to
execute certain professional priority missions. It was eerily as if the
Red Army
conventional generals
knew too much about the ruinous US tactics of the
Vietnam War. The reds certainly copied the worst American
tactics and
techniques of the Vietnam War, which indicates that the available
conventional generals
were too fat and too incompetent. Afghan vs. Soviet
is a small e-book, but it's packed with enough knife-edge facts and
analysis that the reader will find out why the S
oviet conventional generals
missed the most important aspect of the war; and what they should have done to
win it, without excuses.
"Efficiency and excellent organization, bereft of redundancy, is dangerous in war. "The more economical, efficient, and
streamlined an organization the greater its vulnerability. If any single component breaks down, the system's very
perfection will cause the failure to reverberate and magnify itself..." By the same token, more complex armies are more
vulnerable to threats against their supply lines. "The larger an army and the more complex its organization, the more
prompt and serious in effect is a menace to its supply lines, or lines of communications (LOCs)."
Liddell Hart also emphasized the importance of the decisive point when cutting enemy lines of communications."...When
cutting enemy communications, the nearer to the force that the cut is made, the more immediate the effect; the nearer to
the base, the greater the effect.  In either case, the effect becomes much greater and more quickly felt if it is made
against a force in motion.   Among the enemy supply conditions to be considered are: number of supply lines, alternative
supply adaptations possible, and amount of supplies in advanced depots behind the front."
Excerpt from Afghan vs. Soviet Tactics

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Afghan vs. Soviet Tactics  how to cut LOCs and win as in Afghan-Soviet War