| ©2005-2007 QuikManeuvers. All Rights Reserved. |
Afghanistan, the Next US Defeat
 | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  |
Conventional US Generals Are Losing the War
© 2007
120 pages; 12 chapters and 5 appendixes
© 2007
120 pages; 12 chapters and 5 appendixes
Right after 9-11, 100 US Special Forces troops invaded Afghanistan
and in a matter of weeks killed over 30,000 Taliban and al Qaeda
terrorists while seizing over fifty enemy held cities. The victory of the small
back of US Army Special Forces Ober fighters astounded the world as
they achieved a military victory that rivaled every other military victory since
history began.
Soon US Army conventional generals and troops began to takeover the
war in Afghanistan and they rapidly began to “snatch defeat from the jaws
of victory.” Inevitably very conventional maneuver after US Army
conventional generals took over, ended in disaster.
and in a matter of weeks killed over 30,000 Taliban and al Qaeda
terrorists while seizing over fifty enemy held cities. The victory of the small
back of US Army Special Forces Ober fighters astounded the world as
they achieved a military victory that rivaled every other military victory since
history began.
Soon US Army conventional generals and troops began to takeover the
war in Afghanistan and they rapidly began to “snatch defeat from the jaws
of victory.” Inevitably very conventional maneuver after US Army
conventional generals took over, ended in disaster.
Review Table of Contents
“Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, (a man who was forced out of office by the Shinseki clique) was the architect of
the only workable and imaginative "transformation" of the military. He created his outlook after a cold realization that the
Clintonista generals left over from the ruinous Clinton regime had embraced the worse concepts ever to threaten the
lethality of US ground forces. Most of Rumsfeld’s focus was upon transforming the army, the most important ground
combatant force. The army version of transformation was developed by Eric K. Shinseki retired Chief of Staff United
States Army, darling of the media left and a leading Clintonista. He was supported by a host of incompetent and self
serving conventional army generals (some now working for General Dynamics) who became convinced that the US Army
must be converted into a poorly armed, unarmored (no tanks) international police force as a result of their mind melds
with Bubba Clinton. The Balkan experience of the Sjinseki generals clique also infected many of them with a strong
sympathy for muslim imperialism and nation building appeasement handouts as alternatives to victorious combat.
That entire clique of conventional generals were protégés of the neo-marxist President Bubba and had for eight years
adapted Clinton’s view of the world. During Clinton’s administration America’s conventional generals demonstrated a new
low in risk-aversion. Literally every time of crisis that demanded military daring and gumption was parried with a set of
clichés including: “That’s too Hollywood.” “That’s too complicated.” “That’s too dangerous to world peace.”
The army general’s transformation scheme was a serious mistake but a clear example of the decadence of America’s
conventional generals. They wanted to transform the US Army into Bubba Clinton’s version of a military, a Balkans-style
police force. Sihseki and his unimaginative crew asked themselves: “How would a military police force be armed?” By
thumbing through a few books they saw that such a “force” would be very light and organized to fight gangsters who had
no RPGs. The result was Shinseki’s vulnerable, rubber-tired wheeled Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCT). The
SBCTs had little firepower, no armor and were setting ducks for any armed guerilla force. Such units would not be able to
stand up to modern armored army for a moment. Shinseki’s clique bragged that they had rendered the tank obsolescent.
Shinseki’s new army of light weight, poorly armed combatants was supposed to somehow overcome its massive weakness
with the notion of complete situational awareness (The daily images of burning rubber-tired wheeled vehicles in Iraq
makes a mockery of this notion on a daily basis) and stand-off firepower (Where's that firepower supposed to come
from? The air?).”
the only workable and imaginative "transformation" of the military. He created his outlook after a cold realization that the
Clintonista generals left over from the ruinous Clinton regime had embraced the worse concepts ever to threaten the
lethality of US ground forces. Most of Rumsfeld’s focus was upon transforming the army, the most important ground
combatant force. The army version of transformation was developed by Eric K. Shinseki retired Chief of Staff United
States Army, darling of the media left and a leading Clintonista. He was supported by a host of incompetent and self
serving conventional army generals (some now working for General Dynamics) who became convinced that the US Army
must be converted into a poorly armed, unarmored (no tanks) international police force as a result of their mind melds
with Bubba Clinton. The Balkan experience of the Sjinseki generals clique also infected many of them with a strong
sympathy for muslim imperialism and nation building appeasement handouts as alternatives to victorious combat.
That entire clique of conventional generals were protégés of the neo-marxist President Bubba and had for eight years
adapted Clinton’s view of the world. During Clinton’s administration America’s conventional generals demonstrated a new
low in risk-aversion. Literally every time of crisis that demanded military daring and gumption was parried with a set of
clichés including: “That’s too Hollywood.” “That’s too complicated.” “That’s too dangerous to world peace.”
The army general’s transformation scheme was a serious mistake but a clear example of the decadence of America’s
conventional generals. They wanted to transform the US Army into Bubba Clinton’s version of a military, a Balkans-style
police force. Sihseki and his unimaginative crew asked themselves: “How would a military police force be armed?” By
thumbing through a few books they saw that such a “force” would be very light and organized to fight gangsters who had
no RPGs. The result was Shinseki’s vulnerable, rubber-tired wheeled Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCT). The
SBCTs had little firepower, no armor and were setting ducks for any armed guerilla force. Such units would not be able to
stand up to modern armored army for a moment. Shinseki’s clique bragged that they had rendered the tank obsolescent.
Shinseki’s new army of light weight, poorly armed combatants was supposed to somehow overcome its massive weakness
with the notion of complete situational awareness (The daily images of burning rubber-tired wheeled vehicles in Iraq
makes a mockery of this notion on a daily basis) and stand-off firepower (Where's that firepower supposed to come
from? The air?).”
Excerpt from Afghanistan, the Next US Defeat
| other books about Anti-Terrorism other books about Combat Military Leadership other books about Special Warfare other books about Traitors |
| . |
| US |
15
only $
By 2007, US, NATO and coalition forces are on the run in Afghanistan as the Taliban, as Qaeda and Pakistani enemies
are again dominating Afghanistan. Afghanistan, The Next US Defeat explains how US Army conventional generals
drove US Army Special Forces from dominance in Afghanistan and then proceeded to lose the war. US Army
conventional generals are running from the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Cataloging every stupid mistake of
US Army conventional generals in Afghanistan would require several huge volumes, however Afghanistan, The Next
US Defeat reveals information about the military incompetence practiced by US Army conventional generals that will
leave the reader breathless. Afghanistan, The Next US Defeat also explains why US Army Special Forces are still
America’s best war fighters.
are again dominating Afghanistan. Afghanistan, The Next US Defeat explains how US Army conventional generals
drove US Army Special Forces from dominance in Afghanistan and then proceeded to lose the war. US Army
conventional generals are running from the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Cataloging every stupid mistake of
US Army conventional generals in Afghanistan would require several huge volumes, however Afghanistan, The Next
US Defeat reveals information about the military incompetence practiced by US Army conventional generals that will
leave the reader breathless. Afghanistan, The Next US Defeat also explains why US Army Special Forces are still
America’s best war fighters.