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Combat Intelligence Iraq, 2006 - Vol. 2
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Military Intelligence Methods, Iraq
© 2006
282 pages; 15 chapters, 4 appendixes, and 1 intelligence report
© 2006
282 pages; 15 chapters, 4 appendixes, and 1 intelligence report
Volume 2 of Combat Intelligence Iraq, 2006, continues the most exhaustive
treatment available on US Army military Intelligence and reconnaissance
operations in Iraq. This volume focuses upon those highly incompetent US Army
Military Intelligence (MI) battalions that have made such a mess in Iraq. With
eleven more chapters, three beefy appendixes a special intelligence report on
Sunni terrorism, Volume 2 continues the taut coverage of every aspect of the
intelligence effort in Iraq began in Volume 1. We report not only “how it is” in grim
detail, but also “how it should be” in exciting prose. Join us for an excursion down the
narrow, dusty streets of Baghdad’s Sadr City. Look over the shoulder of befuddled
Military Intelligence officers trying to understand reconnaissance. Frown at
the rampant incompetence of generals who understand nothing of intelligence
or reconnaissance. Victory in Iraq or anywhere depends upon competent
intelligence and reconnaissance.
treatment available on US Army military Intelligence and reconnaissance
operations in Iraq. This volume focuses upon those highly incompetent US Army
Military Intelligence (MI) battalions that have made such a mess in Iraq. With
eleven more chapters, three beefy appendixes a special intelligence report on
Sunni terrorism, Volume 2 continues the taut coverage of every aspect of the
intelligence effort in Iraq began in Volume 1. We report not only “how it is” in grim
detail, but also “how it should be” in exciting prose. Join us for an excursion down the
narrow, dusty streets of Baghdad’s Sadr City. Look over the shoulder of befuddled
Military Intelligence officers trying to understand reconnaissance. Frown at
the rampant incompetence of generals who understand nothing of intelligence
or reconnaissance. Victory in Iraq or anywhere depends upon competent
intelligence and reconnaissance.
“An important part of HUMINT is interrogation of enemy prisoners. Such interrogation is no longer possible in the US
armed forces.
Veteran military interrogators say the public release of the Army's new restrictions on techniques tip the hand to terrorists
and enemies worldwide, virtually ruling out the possibility that prisoners will offer up any effective intelligence in the field.
While interrogation instructors are currently undergoing four-hour classes, and the Army is spending millions dispatching
mobile training teams to all corners of the world, those with expertise in battlefield human intelligence say the restrictive
policies will mean more combat deaths and injuries and more successful terrorist attacks.
The new policies now require techniques formerly considered routine in the questioning of hostiles to be approved by
high-ranking officers.
For instance, the technique known as "Mutt and Jeff," or "good cop, bad cop" in civilian terminology now requires
approval by a full colonel. Use of the "False Flag" technique, in which interrogators pretend to be from another country,
requires approval of a colonel. The technique of "separation," which can mean up to 30 days of solitary confinement, now
requires approval by a general.
Critics who have employed these techniques successfully for years in military situations say those requirements alone
would ensure that little meaningful intelligence could be extracted from prisoners. But worse, they say, is the fact that U.S.
enemies around the globe now know just how far U.S. interrogators can go – thereby making it easier to withstand the
pressures applied on them.”
armed forces.
Veteran military interrogators say the public release of the Army's new restrictions on techniques tip the hand to terrorists
and enemies worldwide, virtually ruling out the possibility that prisoners will offer up any effective intelligence in the field.
While interrogation instructors are currently undergoing four-hour classes, and the Army is spending millions dispatching
mobile training teams to all corners of the world, those with expertise in battlefield human intelligence say the restrictive
policies will mean more combat deaths and injuries and more successful terrorist attacks.
The new policies now require techniques formerly considered routine in the questioning of hostiles to be approved by
high-ranking officers.
For instance, the technique known as "Mutt and Jeff," or "good cop, bad cop" in civilian terminology now requires
approval by a full colonel. Use of the "False Flag" technique, in which interrogators pretend to be from another country,
requires approval of a colonel. The technique of "separation," which can mean up to 30 days of solitary confinement, now
requires approval by a general.
Critics who have employed these techniques successfully for years in military situations say those requirements alone
would ensure that little meaningful intelligence could be extracted from prisoners. But worse, they say, is the fact that U.S.
enemies around the globe now know just how far U.S. interrogators can go – thereby making it easier to withstand the
pressures applied on them.”
Excerpt from Combat Intelligence Iraq, 2006 - Vol. 2
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