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Communist Uprising in Sri Lanka
Sri Lankan Counter Terror War
275 pages; 12 chapters and 8 appendixes
Communist Uprising in Sri Lanka is an e-book about an anti-communist war
that the American public knows little about. Although the communist uprising in Sri
Lanka has been going on for 12 years, and communist parties from all over the
world have been aiding the communist Tamil terrorists. They are joined in that
support by communists in many western governments. Although the Tamil reds
have no privileged sanctuary, the Sri Lanka government has wasted twelve years
fighting them. The communist uprising in Sri Lanka is very similar to the situation
in America. For example, ten percent of the population of Sri Lanka is black, but
they want 50% or more of control of the nation. That is just like the power demands
of American blacks. Because the Tamils are black, Western European, and
especially Scandinavian nations, offer whole-hearted political support. Since those
nations are controlled by socialists, they are anti-white and pro-Tamil, a grim irony.
The communist uprising in Sri Lanka has failed to result in the destruction of the
communist Tamil enemy, because of the leftist political influence on the Sri
Lanka government by the US government. US leftists have required the leftist
Sri Lanka government to practice all the wrong-headed American approaches to
insurgency and kow-towing to blacks and other minorities. Such behavior has cost
the US government defeat in every major war since World War II. The Sri Lankans
obey US political dictates in exchange for foreign aid. As a result, the communist
uprising in Sri Lanka has been mishandled for over a decade because of leftist
sabotage. However, Communist Uprising in Sri Lanka not only demonstrates the
self-defeating ideas of the US government, but also fully describes the bestial
enemy and how he could easily be beaten.
"There were two Sri Lankan infantry battalions supported by a troop of artillery garrisoning the Mulaitiuv Fortified Base.
The camp had a few naval personnel who operated a ground-based radar that covered the sea front. The areas of
responsibility of the garrison were divided between North and South and each infantry was responsible for 7.5 kilometers
of the camp perimeter. Such a long perimeter indicated that special defense measures were necessary, for example
arming mutually supporting strong points with three machine guns and 2 RPGs per squad and increased use of barbed
war, landmines and fougasse,
The camp was only relatively isolated with the closest camp to the south being twenty-five kilometers away in Weli Oya.
The other was nearest camp was located about thirty-five kilometers to the North. The camp was supported by air and
sea forces and should have been able to defend itself for a few days at least, until help arrived.
There were no major enemy combat incidents before the attack in June 1996, but there were numerous contacts with
Tamil terrorist reconnaissance elements. A number of enemy recon teams were located and killed during the two years
just before the attack. Why the experienced Sri Lanka Army did not perceive continuous long-term enemy recon, a typical
pattern, as a red flag warning of an imminent attack is a mystery. The word incompetence of course applies."
Excerpt from Communist Uprising in Sri Lanka
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