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Espionage Manual 28 - CIA in the Orient
CIA Weakness Exploited: 1959-2005
101 pages, 8 chapters
Espionage Manual #28 - CIA in the Orient is an introduction to the CIA failure tradition with
eastern and middle eastern nations. The e-book Espionage Manual #28 - CIA in the Orient
discusses CIA performance in Laos, Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq. The reader will be
introduced to the strange approaches which the CIA reserves for international operations.
The pattern of CIA operations as outlined in Espionage Manual #28 - CIA in the Orient will
astound the reader with its amateurism. The greatest lesson of Espionage Manual #28 - CIA
in the Orient is that professionals always prevail in espionage combat. It may occur to the
reader that since the CIA has been in operation for over sixty years, why is it still so
amateurish? Espionage Manual #28 - CIA in the Orient explains how CIA incompetence
and treason continues to insure that nearly every CIA operation is a failure. Espionage
Manual #28 - CIA in the Orient also provides valuable how-to information regarding tough
minded and non-lickspittle approaches to dealing with arrogant foreign enemies.
“South Vietnam's Central Intelligence Office (CIO), an Oriental copy of the CIA, was targeted against the VC
infrastructure, or communist support network. However, the CIO's performance was lackluster, its' CIA advisers not
withstanding. Together they failed to relate the Ho Chi Minh Trail to the red infrastructure, conduct the barest
semblance of counterespionage, field a viable agent network or accomplish much else either. At the same time they
were heavily infiltrated buy enemy agents.
In fact, the first major allied intelligence agency to become a North Vietnamese intelligence asset was South Vietnam's
CIA-trained, Central Intelligence Organization (CIO): "...the CIA was handicapped in obtaining intelligence on North
Vietnam and its forces in the south. One reason lay in... agency errors...That meant the South Vietnamese would have
to shoulder most of the intelligence-gathering responsibility. The South Vietnamese, however, failed totally, and by
1967, it was clear to the CIA that there was no hope that their allies could gather even the most elementary intelligence
on the North Vietnamese..."
At its peak, the CIA deployed over eight hundred American and nearly 30,000 foreign operatives in South Vietnam. Yet
they never developed any functional human intelligence assets capable of reporting inside data on enemy intentions,
plans or movements. The Ho Chi Minh Trail System was practically ignored. Instead, mountains of raw data gleaned
from communications intercepts, sensors, rumors, captured documents and POW interrogations were produced and
filed away. Much of that material was enemy planted static, intended as both deception and as a means of overloading
Americas' mechanical intelligence cycle.
CIA-controlled intelligence during the Second Indochina War never effectively penetrated any segment of the North
Vietnamese hierarchy during the Vietnam War. They were never able to ascertain enemy intentions in advance and
were invariably surprised at all levels because: (1) US intelligence chiefly relied on South Vietnamese intelligence and
police services for information about the enemy. Those services were penetrated by the communists. (2) Only an
infinitesimal number of US intelligence bureaucrats could speak Vietnamese and none of them had more than an
imperfect knowledge of the country and the enemy. (3) The six to twelve months intelligence agency tour of duty was too
short to develop the necessary intuitive grasp of enemy military and political behavior. The average one-year tour of
duty was too short to develop any understanding of Vietnamese thought patterns, much less, "develop the necessary
intuitive grasp of the enemy's military and political behavior.'
NORTH VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST PENETRATION OF THE CIA
Unit B-36, the North Vietnamese intelligence service, thoroughly penetrated all allied intelligence organizations during
the Vietnam War. Thirty thousand of their operatives were emplaced at all levels of the allied intelligence hierarchy.
Many Vietnamese interpreters, for example, were red agents. US intelligence, as inept at counter espionage as it was at
all other intelligence arts, remained helpless to combat the penetration, deception and outright control concomitant to
penetration on such a mammoth scale. The first question that any professional must ask is how to deal with such a
mess. The answer is ..."
Excerpt from Espionage Manual # 28 - CIA in the Orient
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