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German Army vs. Soviet Partisans on the Eastern Front
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German Army Defense of Berlin in World War II
German Army Defense of Berlin
World War II, Battle of Berlin
© 2006
131 pages; 8 chapters and 1 appendix
German Army Defense of Berlin was written by officers of the
German General Staff after World War II, while they were still held
captive in Allied concentration camps.
German Army Defense of
is therefore an historical artifact that has been modified for
current consumption by QuikManeuvers. This book reveals much
interesting and surprising information about the thought processes
and problem solving ability of the men who wrote the book. The
arrogant pessimism and
mediocre thinking common to most
members of the German General Staff
is well represented in this
book. It is obvious that the men who wrote it were ill informed about
nearly all major aspects of the
defense of Berlin, although they did
include many fragmentary pieces of historical evidence that should
prove interesting to any student of war.
Review Table of Contents
“On the evening of 23 April, General Weidling took command of the city and that same night moved the troops of the 56th
Panzer Corps into Berlin. The divisions were immediately committed at crucial points in the battle lines. Remnants of the
20th Panzer Grenadier Division went into action in the southwest, Panzer Division "Muenchenberg" in the southeast, SS
Panzer Grenadier Division "Nordland" and remnants of SS Panzer Grenadier Division "Nederland" in the east, and the
18th Panzer Grenadier Division in the northern and southern parts of the Zoo sector. This indication of the distribution of
forces can serve only as a general guide, since the position and composition of the units changed daily and even hourly.
The Panzer corps and the SS units under Mohnke now carried the burden of the stiffening resistance to the
uninterrupted Russian attacks, which were concentrated in the southeast, east, and north. In the west, Berlin was
attacked by comparatively weaker forces, but they were still far superior to the defenders. The forces advancing from the
south behind the 1st Ukrainian Army Group had to divert elements against the Ninth Army, Potsdam, and later the Twelfth
In the course of heavy fighting, the German troops were pushed back to the city circuit railroad and even beyond it. By 30
April only the government sector, the immediate vicinity of the Tiergarten and a strip extending westward from the Zoo
sector to the Havel River were still held by the defenders. The Russians employed a planned and methodical procedure
of attack. Bombing and heavy artillery and mortar fire preceded every fresh assault. The infantry was supported by tanks
advancing singly or in group formation and by engineer troops with flame-throwers and demolition equipment. Advances
were made by small sectors - street by street and house by house. The infantry took every opportunity to infiltrate
through back yards, cellar passageways, subway tunnels, and sewers. In this way many of the defense positions were
stormed from behind or below.”
Excerpt from German Army Defense of Berlin
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German General Staff and Defense of Berlin in World War II
The book repeats the endless mantra of German generals, which was distributed so widely after World War II, namely that
every decision made by hundreds of divisions, corps, armies, and army groups were simultaneously
micro-managed by
Adolph Hitler
from a tiny cubical hidden under the Reich’s Chancellery using World War II type technology. Only the
could think that Hitler could have micro-managed his far-flung legions with the exquisite precision attributed
to him by his enemies on the
German General Staff. In fact, as German Army Defense of Berlin accurately spotlights,
many hundreds of military mistakes coupled with thousands of incidences of military sabotage were implemented by German
generals and the
German General Staff during World War II precisely because Hitler was not able to monitor their
German Army Defense of Berlin accentuates not only the World War II Battle of Berlin, but also the
mediocrity of the military leadership provided by German generals and high staff officers. The mistakes that they made, wholly
and falsely
attributed to Adolph Hitler, are accurately described in German Army Defense of Berlin. These mistakes are
so obvious that only military amateurs would fail to note them. Such amateurs are found within western armed forces and the
historical literature genre.