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German Battlefield Intelligence
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Secrets of Frontline German Army Intelligence
© 2006
75 pages; 4 chapters
© 2006
75 pages; 4 chapters
Battlefield Intelligence provides insider information about German Army
intelligence on the Eastern Front in World War 2. Although German Army
intelligence was only mediocre in most cases, German Army intelligence on the
Eastern Front was above average. Battlefield Intelligence is a sourcebook for
information regarding German Army intelligence reconnaissance and
interrogation, as well as discussing the work of German Corps and Division’s G2s
on the Eastern Front.
intelligence on the Eastern Front in World War 2. Although German Army
intelligence was only mediocre in most cases, German Army intelligence on the
Eastern Front was above average. Battlefield Intelligence is a sourcebook for
information regarding German Army intelligence reconnaissance and
interrogation, as well as discussing the work of German Corps and Division’s G2s
on the Eastern Front.
Review Table of Contents
“The importance attached to troop reconnaissance is illustrated in two instances
reported by the Germans. In June 1944, before the attack in the Lemberg-Przemysl
sector, daily trains were observed on the route Zaleszcyki-Czortkow from an
observation post west of the Stypa River (an eastern tributary of the Dniester River).
When going south the trains were empty; when going north they were loaded, partly
with tanks. This was a valuable indication that the Thirty-eighth Army and the Fourth
Armored Army were being moved from, the Kolomyya-Horodenko area (south of the
Dniester River) into the Tarnopol area.”
“When the Russians broke out of the Baranov bridgehead, it was difficult to decide
whether they would go west or north-northwest. The arclike deployment of their artillery
gave no definite indication, but detailed observation of local enemy reconnaissance
activities, when plotted on a map, depicted much enemy scouting toward the west. That
scouting pattern indicated a planned Soviet thrust toward the west. That analysis
proved to be the case.”
reported by the Germans. In June 1944, before the attack in the Lemberg-Przemysl
sector, daily trains were observed on the route Zaleszcyki-Czortkow from an
observation post west of the Stypa River (an eastern tributary of the Dniester River).
When going south the trains were empty; when going north they were loaded, partly
with tanks. This was a valuable indication that the Thirty-eighth Army and the Fourth
Armored Army were being moved from, the Kolomyya-Horodenko area (south of the
Dniester River) into the Tarnopol area.”
“When the Russians broke out of the Baranov bridgehead, it was difficult to decide
whether they would go west or north-northwest. The arclike deployment of their artillery
gave no definite indication, but detailed observation of local enemy reconnaissance
activities, when plotted on a map, depicted much enemy scouting toward the west. That
scouting pattern indicated a planned Soviet thrust toward the west. That analysis
proved to be the case.”
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Excerpts from German Battlefield Intelligence
