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How To Be A Modern Combat General
© 2003
338 pages; 18 chapters and 2 appendix
© 2003
338 pages; 18 chapters and 2 appendix
Now you can learn how to be a modern combat general in the safety of your own
home! An understanding of real warfighting will be at your fingertips. The first book
written in the modern era that will equip the reader with the basic knowledge and
decision skills to be a modern combat general. The intellectual tools of combat
including, planning, intelligence, deception, staff management and operational scale are
explained in a user-friendly fashion. You too can become a master of maneuver,
momentum and tempo. Learn how a modern combat general dominates and
manipulates: The Art of Maneuver; Analysis Concepts for Generals; Orchestrating Deep
Battle; Command and Commander’s Intent; Staff Inspired Command Chaos; Control and
Communications; Command Post Problems; High Level Combat Deception; and
Strategic/Operational Campaigning.
home! An understanding of real warfighting will be at your fingertips. The first book
written in the modern era that will equip the reader with the basic knowledge and
decision skills to be a modern combat general. The intellectual tools of combat
including, planning, intelligence, deception, staff management and operational scale are
explained in a user-friendly fashion. You too can become a master of maneuver,
momentum and tempo. Learn how a modern combat general dominates and
manipulates: The Art of Maneuver; Analysis Concepts for Generals; Orchestrating Deep
Battle; Command and Commander’s Intent; Staff Inspired Command Chaos; Control and
Communications; Command Post Problems; High Level Combat Deception; and
Strategic/Operational Campaigning.
Review Table of Contents
“In August, 1990, US Central Command (CENTCOM) under US Army General H. Norman Schwarzkopf was
ensconced at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. CENTCOM's current operations room looked like a scene out of the
movie "War Games." Computers arrayed all around the room displayed the status of everything, everywhere. A plethora
of information was there at the military staff's fingertips: "...from the status of transport ships headed for the ports of Saudi
Arabia to the current Iraqi order of battle. On the large, color monitors overhead was the constant vision of the Cable
News Network and an electronic map on the center wall tracked the US carrier groups in the region and the transit of
Iraqi merchant vessels.
There was pressure on US Army General H. Norman Schwarzkopf to immediately move to Saudi Arabia and personally
direct Coalition strategy from there. But he hesitated. "The irony of the modern age was that the CENTCOM commander,
at the outset of the crisis, could gather more intelligence information and more effectively control his forces 7,000 miles
away from the theater of operations than from the Saudi Ministry of Defense...Not only did CENTCOM have to await the
build-up of its forces but also the development of a communications infrastructure to fight the war..." At least that is the
opinion of a US computer officer who wrote an article in Military Review. Such men believe that communicating, by
computer, telephone or radio is the same as control and is, therefore, command. They really believe that a general can
effectively "control his forces from 7,000 miles" away. Most US general believe that too. But they are wrong.
Communications devices are message transmission devices, they have no capacity for command or control, and their use
does not assure either.
American C3 (command, control and communications), "...systems operate at a level of technological sophistication that
far exceeds commanders' human capacities to operate effectively. Specifically, computer-based C3 systems have
increased the rate and density of information flow to such an extent that commanders become overwhelmed and are
unable to process the input effectively, resulting in less-than-optimal decision-making. Thus, contrary to expectations, the
very systems that were designed to enhance battlefield decision making actually hamper it...The solution therefore is...to
design systems that complement and enhance human capabilities..."
The results of excessive, superfluous data collection are predictable. During Operation Desert Shield, overwhelming staff
communications of impressive but meaningless volumes of information caused one frustrated commander to repeatedly
ask his staff to "tell me what you are telling me." Even US Army General H. Norman Schwarzkopf complained.
One of the greatest unspoken hindrances to command of the Persian Gulf War would prove to be the American military's
deeply entrenched electronic "command and control" system. That system featured high technology gadgetry and
communications as the primary means of influencing operations by remote control. Every headquarters, at every level of
warfighting, was burdened with every known modern means of communications. If that wasn't enough, there were
thousands of fax machines, couriers and courier aircraft by the score. Mobile satellite ground stations were everywhere
as bureaucrats fought turf disputes over frequency bandwidths and access.”
ensconced at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. CENTCOM's current operations room looked like a scene out of the
movie "War Games." Computers arrayed all around the room displayed the status of everything, everywhere. A plethora
of information was there at the military staff's fingertips: "...from the status of transport ships headed for the ports of Saudi
Arabia to the current Iraqi order of battle. On the large, color monitors overhead was the constant vision of the Cable
News Network and an electronic map on the center wall tracked the US carrier groups in the region and the transit of
Iraqi merchant vessels.
There was pressure on US Army General H. Norman Schwarzkopf to immediately move to Saudi Arabia and personally
direct Coalition strategy from there. But he hesitated. "The irony of the modern age was that the CENTCOM commander,
at the outset of the crisis, could gather more intelligence information and more effectively control his forces 7,000 miles
away from the theater of operations than from the Saudi Ministry of Defense...Not only did CENTCOM have to await the
build-up of its forces but also the development of a communications infrastructure to fight the war..." At least that is the
opinion of a US computer officer who wrote an article in Military Review. Such men believe that communicating, by
computer, telephone or radio is the same as control and is, therefore, command. They really believe that a general can
effectively "control his forces from 7,000 miles" away. Most US general believe that too. But they are wrong.
Communications devices are message transmission devices, they have no capacity for command or control, and their use
does not assure either.
American C3 (command, control and communications), "...systems operate at a level of technological sophistication that
far exceeds commanders' human capacities to operate effectively. Specifically, computer-based C3 systems have
increased the rate and density of information flow to such an extent that commanders become overwhelmed and are
unable to process the input effectively, resulting in less-than-optimal decision-making. Thus, contrary to expectations, the
very systems that were designed to enhance battlefield decision making actually hamper it...The solution therefore is...to
design systems that complement and enhance human capabilities..."
The results of excessive, superfluous data collection are predictable. During Operation Desert Shield, overwhelming staff
communications of impressive but meaningless volumes of information caused one frustrated commander to repeatedly
ask his staff to "tell me what you are telling me." Even US Army General H. Norman Schwarzkopf complained.
One of the greatest unspoken hindrances to command of the Persian Gulf War would prove to be the American military's
deeply entrenched electronic "command and control" system. That system featured high technology gadgetry and
communications as the primary means of influencing operations by remote control. Every headquarters, at every level of
warfighting, was burdened with every known modern means of communications. If that wasn't enough, there were
thousands of fax machines, couriers and courier aircraft by the score. Mobile satellite ground stations were everywhere
as bureaucrats fought turf disputes over frequency bandwidths and access.”
Excerpt from Warlord
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